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Adaptation is the adjustment in natural or human sys-
tems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or 
their effects, to moderate harm or capitalize on opportuni-
ties. So institutionalisation of adaptation is the process of 
identifying the role of these ‘adjustments’ and establish-
ing them as a major response to climate change by put-
ting in place agreements and mechanisms to implement 
adaptation. The institutions involved in this international 
process are governmental and non-governmental organi-
zations, regimes, and implicit rules (such as reciprocity). 
The regime most important in this paper is the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Eighteen years after its establishment in 1992, 
this incremental process of institutionalising adaptation 
culminated in the 2010 Cancún Adaptation Framework 
(CAF). In the CAF the Parties affirmed that adaptation 
should receive the same priority as mitigation. 
Adaptation is mentioned explicitly in the UNFCCC 
convention text of 1992. When it entered into force two 
years later, its signatory countries (the Parties) committed 
to establish measures to facilitate adaptation to climate 
change, to cooperate in adaptation measures, and that 
developed country Parties will assist developing country 
Parties in meeting the costs of adaptation. Over the years, 
the Conference of the Parties (COP; the highest authority 
of the Convention), has made several decisions on adap-
tation that reiterated the convention’s commitments on 
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Climate change is one of the key challenges to mankind in the 21st century. Even under drastic cuts in global 
greenhouse gas emissions, climate change adaptation will be necessary for decades to come. Although varying over 
time and space, the impacts of climate change are likely to exacerbate food insecurity, increase the number of people 
affected by weather-related disasters, trigger economic and biodiversity loss, and cause local and regional political 
instability. Developing countries will be disproportionally affected due to their geographic locations and high vulner-
ability. Adaptation to climate change is highly necessary but the capacity to adapt in many developing countries 
is severely constrained by a lack of institutions, infrastructure, knowledge and financial resources. Therefore, the 
international community has a distinct role to support adaptation in developing countries. Following the ‘polluter 
pays principle’, the large share of historic greenhouse gas emissions of developed countries makes them responsible 
for financing adaptation. Climate change adaptation is estimated to cost tens of billions US Dollar per annum in the 
coming decades. Without proper institutionalisation of adaptation, this money cannot be mobilised, administrated 
and disbursed in an adequate, transparent and predictable manner. 
This SEF Policy Paper takes stock of the current status of institutionalization and financing of adaptation. In section 
1 we show that adaptation has been institutionalised internationally, and point at the need to equip the national and 
local levels to take on the adaptation challenge. In section 2 we elaborate on the nexus between Official Development 
Aid (ODA) and climate finance and show the need for a straightforward and broadly accepted definition of climate 
finance and criteria for reporting on it. Section 3 provides an overview of current financial resources for adaptation 
and shows that these still fall short compared to the amount needed in developing countries. Finally, in section 4 
we propose ways to capitalize on current opportunities to improve the institutionalisation and financing of climate 
change adaptation.
I. Institutionalizing adaptation to climate change
support and funding for adaptation including impact and 
vulnerability assessments, awareness creation, capacity 
building, knowledge exchange, and technology transfer 
(see Figure 1). Over the years a variety of working pro-
grammes, expert groups and funds on adaptation has 
been established. Facing the risks of fragmentation and a 
lack of transparency in this incremental process, the de-
veloping countries’ demanded more coherence in adap-
tation action under the UNFCCC, which resulted in the 
development of the Adaptation Committee The COP has 
thus driven the institutionalisation of adaptation which 
has resulted in a complex and expanding constellation of 
institutions and actors as illustrated in figure 1 and 2. 
This constellation has been heavily influenced by differ-
ent networks and coalitions of parties). The division into 
Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries and the associated 
obligations has so far driven negotiations and decisions 
within the UNFCCC. The Annex I Parties (mostly in-
dustrialised countries) and the Annex II Parties (mostly 
developing countries) further group themselves into 
geographic regions or according to major interests in 
the UNFCCC negotiations. Prominent among the UN-
FCCC recognised groups, for instance, is the Group 
of ‘G-77 plus China’, which comprises 132 developing 
country members.  Although this group has shaped deci-
sions and actions, the differing interests of this diverse 
group makes individual developing countries or regional 
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groups to also intervene in debates. Such groups include 
the ‘Africa Group’ whose common interest is to improve 
burden sharing in adaptation financing; the ‘Alliance of 
Small Island States’ (AOSIS) that have a common concern 
of reducing vulnerability to sea-level rise; and the Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) group that aims to increase 
support for improving its members’ adaptive capacity. 
The European Union (EU) with its 27 members is another 
major regional group that often has a common negotiat-
ing position among its members. 
Actions at the international level have triggered various 
regional and national strategies and plans to respond to 
climate change. The recently established Africa Climate 
Policy Centre is a good regional example. At national lev-
els, many developing and developed countries have for-
mulated national climate change response strategies (e.g. 
Kenya, Nigeria, Switzerland, and Germany). As a result 
of the UNFCCC process, most LDCs have already devel-
oped their National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPA). The NAPAs focus on direct needs for adapta-
tion and priority projects were formulated. Based on the 
Cancun agreements, the LDCs will soon develop longer-
term adaptation plans in their National Adaptation Plans 
(NAP). However, adaptation strategies are in many cases 
still limited to national levels and to the national authori-
ties representing governments at the UNFCCC. There is 
thus a need for both a horizontal (link to other govern-
ment authorities at national levels) and vertical (inter-
national, national, sub-national and local levels) main-
streaming of climate change adaptation.
Besides inter-governmental and governmental action on 
climate change, NGOs and other non-state actors are also 
increasingly active in institutionalising climate change 
adaptation,often at a national level, but also at an inter-
national level. The Climate Action Network (CAN), for 
instance, is a global network representing 700 NGOs in 
more than 90 countries. They contribute to the institution-
alisation of adaptation inter alia through awareness cam-
paigns, capacity building, advocacy, observing climate 
negotiations, and playing a watch-dog role on climate 
financing.
Institutionalising adaptation has thus been a multi-level 
process (at international, regional and national levels) 
involving multilateral organisations and bilateral donors 
and extending beyond the UNFCCC regime towards de-
Bureau
Conference of the Parties (COP)/ COP Serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)
Transitional Committee GCF
Subsidiary Bodies
Constituted bodies
Compliance Committee
Executive Board, CDM
JI Supervisory Committee
Adaptation Fund Board
Technology Executive Committee
Other bodies
Standing Committee?
Adaptation Committee?
Expert groups
LDC expert group
National Communications from Parties not included 
in Annex I to the Conventions (consultative)
SBSTA
Nairobi Work Programme
SBI
Ad Hoc WG on Further 
Commitments under the KP
Ad Hoc WG on Long-term 
Cooperative Action
Secretariat Cooperative arrangements
GEF (finance)
United Nations
IPCC
UN High Level Advisory 
Group on Climate Financing
UNEP, 
UNDP, 
etc.
Joint Implementation Liaison 
Group CBD, UNCCD, UNFCCC
Figure 1. Institutional set up of the UNFCCC
CDM= Clean Development Mechanism; GCF= Green Climate Fund; GEF= The Global Environment Facility; IPCC= Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change; JI= Joint Implementation; KP= Kyoto Protocol; LDC= Least Developed Countries; SBI= Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation; SBSTA= Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice; UNCCD= United Nations Convention to Combat De-
sertification; UNDP= United Nations Development Programme; UNEP= United Nations Environment Programme; WG= working group 
Source: based on UNFCCC Bodies. http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php.
4 Climate Change Adaptation
velopment cooperation. By establishing the Joint Liaison 
Group of the Rio Conventions (Figure 1) to ensure coher-
ence between the conventions, adaptation became fur-
ther institutionalised in other multi-lateral environmen-
tal frameworks. Multilateral organisations such as the 
World Bankalso influence the adaptation discourse and 
action through targeted funds and initiatives. In many 
cases, UN-Programmes (Figure 1) such as the United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP)  and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have been in-
strumental in capacity building in developing countries 
and in guiding the LDCs in the National Adaptation Pro-
grammes of Action (NAPA) process.
To conclude, climate change adaptation has been in-
creasingly institutionalised internationally. National in-
stitutionalisation of adaptation varies from country to 
country, but is increasing rapidly, partly because of the 
international push (e.g. NAPAs and NAPs). However, at 
the local level, awareness of climate change is often low 
and local knowledge is generally not adequately har-
nessed by public institutions. Hence further action is re-
quired to institutionalize adaptation both at the national 
and local levels. In the overall process of institutionali-
sation some hot topics remain, two of which are subse-
quently discussed in this paper: 1) the clarification of the 
distinction between adaptation and development, and 2) 
how to finance adaptation in developing countries.
Figure 2. Bilateral funds, multilateral funds and multi-donor trust funds on climate change finance
CBFF= Congo Basin Forest Fund; CCTF= Climate Change Trust Fund; CTF= Clean Technology Fund; FCPF= Forst Carbon Part-
nership Facility; FIP= Forest Investment Programme; GCCA= Global Climate Change Alliance; GEF= Global Environment Facility; 
GEEREF= Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund; ICF= International Climate Fund; ICI= International Climate Ini-
tiative; IFCI= International Forest Carbon Initiative; LDCF= Least Developed Country Fund; MDG-E&CC= Millenium Development 
Goals, Environment and Climate Change thematic window; MDTF= Multi-Donor Trust Fund; PPCR= Pilot Programme for Climate 
Resilience; SCCF= Special Climate Change Fund; SCF= Strategic Climate Fund; SPA= Strategic Priority on Adaptation; SREP= Scal-
ing-up Renewable Energy Programme for low income countries; UN-REDD= United Nations collaborative Programme on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries. Source: based on Caravani, A., Bird, N. & Schalatek, 
L. (2010). Climate Finance Fundamentals. Brief 2, November 2010. Heinrich Böll Stiftung and  Overseas Development Institute.
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II. Adaptation and development
There is no operational definition of adaptation that can 
be used to specify adaptive measures and then estimate 
the associated capital and operation costs . Develop-
ment is often considered as adaptation, and vice versa. 
For instance, investment in adaptation strategies such as 
efficient irrigation systems and flood defence lowers the 
impact of natural disasters, but at the same time drives 
economic growth by strengthening infrastructure and 
spurring the development of new technologies. This 
feeds directly into the discussion to what extent climate 
finance can be accounted as Official Development As-
sistance (ODA). The Copenhagen Accord mentions that 
climate finance shall be ‘new and additional’, but this 
concept has no operational definition yet and is inter-
preted in different ways. On the one hand, many donor 
countries seek to link and partly integrate adaptation fi-
nance and ODA. For example, much of the Dutch, Dan-
ish and Japanese contributions to Fast Start Finance (cf. 
page no. 6 ) already existed and was simply relabelled. 
Many developed countries also consider climate finance 
as a part of their ODA contribution to support the Mil-
lenium Development Goals related to environment. The 
Netherlands is an interesting case as it made a complete 
change-over recently. Their new government changed 
their vision from climate finance that should be over 
and above the 0.7% GNI commitment, to full inclusion 
of climate finance within the 0,7% commitment. On the 
other hand, recipient countries argue that funding for 
adaptation should cover the additional costs of climate 
change and be separate from existing ODA commit-
ments. This discussion leaves the puzzled development 
community in a catch 22. On the one hand the develop-
ment community is forced to take into account climate 
change as it could set back all achievements towards 
reaching the Millennium Development Goals, but on 
the other hand there is the fear that the attention given 
towards climate change results in more climate finance 
at the expense of ODA. Development NGOs thus gen-
erally insists on a clear distinction between climate fi-
nance and ODA, whereby climate finance is over and 
above ODA.
In practice, all funds can be classified both as ODA 
and as climate finance except for the Adaptation Fund 
which is classified as climate finance. To work towards 
a clarification between ODA and climate finance, the 
EU requested all its member states to declare their 
working definitions of new and additional finance. Ger-
many’s definition of additional is twofold. All climate 
finance should be additional to the reference (2009) 
levels of ODA expenditure on climate; and all funding 
by new financing sources (e.g. the auctioning of emis-
sion allowance units) is also additional. To distinguish 
ODA and climate finance, and following the example of 
earlier Rio markers to track development aid, the De-
velopment Assistance Committee of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 
DAC) in 2009 developed the Rio markers for climate 
change adaptation. These adaptation markers differen-
tiate between adaptation as a principle reason for an ac-
tivity (without this reason the activity would not have 
been funded) and adaptation being a ‘significant’ objec-
tive. When these two are summed up they proved an 
estimate or upper bound of climate change adaptation 
finance. Any other activities might be screened against 
climate adaptation goals, but are not targeted at adap-
tation specifically. Many donor countries have already 
adopted these markers. But even if this ambiguous defi-
nition proves to be able to distinguish between ODA 
and climate finance, it will take a few years before the 
extent to which adaptation funding is ‘new and addi-
tional’ and its effects on ODA can be assessed.
In addition to financing adaptation, development coop-
eration is also increasingly involved in institutionalising 
adaptation through efforts to integrate adaptation into 
national development plans and development projects 
in developing countries. The German Organization for 
International Cooperation (GIZ), for instance, now uses 
climate proofing tools to identify the risks that climate 
change poses to its development interventions and how 
to reduce such risks. Development NGOs and other 
non-state actors have also raised the profile of adapta-
tion through advocacy, policy advice and implementa-
tion of concrete adaptation actions on all levels from 
local to global. The development cooperation brings 
along important lessons for institutionalization and fi-
nancing of climate change adaptation, especially when 
it comes to key concepts such as ownership, transpar-
ency and predictability.
Recommendations
Whilst development cooperation and climate finance 
communities share their goal of climate compatible 
social, environmental and economic development, 
the current finance debate divides them. We rec-
ommend the improvement of straightforward defi-
nitions that are able to label projects as climate fi-
nance and distinguish them from ODA. This will only 
work out if the definitions are broadly accepted by 
donors and recipient countries alike. The OECD DAC 
markers could be a starting point, but its procedure 
of self-reporting by donors needs to be addressed in 
Climate Change Adaptation6
Both developed and developing countries generally ar-
gue for equity and justice on burden sharing of the cli-
mate change impacts caused by greenhouse gas emis-
sions of developed countries. Calculations of the cost 
of global adaptation to climate change provide nothing 
more than estimates and vary to a large extent. Studies 
of the World Bank, Oxfam, the UNFCCC and others do 
however show that climate change adaptation alone will 
cost tens of billions of US dollars annually in develop-
ing countries. In recent years, developed countries have 
stepped up their activities and pledged almost USD 32 
billion of climate finance for both mitigation and adap-
tation, both within and outside UNFCCC. But currently 
only about 20% is spent on adaptation – a division pos-
sibly fuelled by developed countries’ higher interests in 
mitigation. In general, developed countries seem incapa-
ble to mobilize tens of billions annually in a predictable, 
constant and transparent manner. And they stand alone: 
so far the lion’s share of pledged finance comes from the 
traditional donor countries of the OECD. For example, a 
modest donor like Ireland has pledged twice the amount 
of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Af-
rica) altogether. Given the rapidly increasing contribu-
tions to global greenhouse gas emissions of the BRICS, 
it would be in line with the polluter pays principle to de-
mand higher contributions to climate finance from them.
Climate finance has been disbursed through more than 
20 bilateral and multilateral funds. Some of them are em-
bedded under the UNFCCC, others are not. (See Figure 
2). The largest disbursements come from the Global Envi-
ronment Facility (GEF) trust funds (USD 834 million) and 
Germany’s International Climate Initiative (USD 574 mil-
lion), but these funds have a limited role for adaptation 
(85 and 18 million, respectively). The largest disburse-
ments on adaptation all come from multilateral funds see 
figure 2 and 3). The biggest fund is the Least Developed 
Countries Fund (LDCF; USD 104 million) which aims to 
III. Current status of financing climate change adaptation
order to improve transparency. A broadly accepted 
and straightforward definition of climate finance is 
also very important to determine future amounts 
of climate finance given that it is foreseen to come 
from a wide variety of sources including public, pri-
vate and innovative mechanisms. Furthermore, it in-
creases transparency and might also increase devel-
oping countries’ the accessibility to funding.
Figure 3: Approved and received climate change adaptation finance per fund
AF= Adaptation Fund (multilateral); GEF4= GEF Trust Fund – Climate Change focal area (multilateral, closed); GCCA= Global Climate 
Change Alliance (EU); HI-Pu= Hatoyama Initiative Public sources (Japan); ICI= International Climate Initiative (Germany); LDCF= 
Least Developed Country Fund (multilateral); MDG= MDG Achievement Fund – environment and climate change thematic window 
(multilateral, but Spain was only donor); PPCR= Pilot Program on Climate Resilience; SCCF= Special Climate Change Fund (multi-
lateral); SPA= Strategic Priority on Adaptation (multilateral, closed). Source: www.climatefundsupdate.org, data from October 2011.
HI-PuGCCAGEF4AF ICI LDCF MDG PPCR SCCF SPA
400
Approved and received climate change adaptation finance
Fund
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
M
ill
io
n 
U
SD
Approved funding (USD, mn) Received funding (USD, mn)
gen and Cancun and a positive sign of developed country 
commitment. It is unclear how much of the pledged and 
already deposited money will be allocated to adaptation 
(See Figure 4) and how much will go the most vulnerable 
countries. But in concordance with the Copenhagen Ac-
cord the current disbursement on climate change adapta-
tion largely went to the most vulnerable countries (LDCs, 
Africa and Small Island Developing States (SIDS)). The 
LDCs have received 40% of the current adaptation fi-
nance, Africa 34% and the SIDS 15%. This does however 
involve significant double counting: São Tomé and Prínc-
ipe for instance is among both the LDCs and SIDS and 
is located in Africa. Around 47% of the received finance 
went to global and regional projects and to countries not 
falling under any of these categories (the Philippines, 
Colombia and China in particular). Of the adaptation 
finance that is in the pipeline (‘approved funding’) only 
45% goes to these global and regional projects and to the 
countries not falling under the LDCs, Africa or SIDS.
However, vulnerable developing countries still have rea-
sons to be critical. First of all, current levels of climate fi-
nance are inadequate. Less than a third of the pledged 
finance has been approved, and only eight per cent of the 
pledged funds have been received. Most pledges come 
from public sources, sometimes enlarged by private sec-
tor funding when it concerns mitigation. Japan alone is 
currently responsible for 50% of the pledged fast start fi-
nance. This shows great commitment of Japan, but also 
the weakness of voluntary contributions. The lack of a 
distribution key might be problematic in the long run. 
Who will fill the gap if Japan single-handedly decides to 
contribute less in the future? Public revenue transfers are 
thus likely to be incapable of meeting the goal of gener-
ating USD 100 billion every year starting in 2020. New 
international funding mechanisms are necessary that 
need to be politically feasible, effective and economically 
efficient. Levies on international aviation and maritime 
transport could for example leverage up to 19 billion and 
6 billion annually, respectively, and are an incentive to 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions. These international 
mechanisms are both effective and economically efficient. 
They are, however, politically hard to implement because 
opposition can be expected from a variety of countries in-
cluding those with large transport sectors, distant coun-
tries with large tourism sectors and SIDS –which can only 
be reached by air and maritime transport. The levies are 
being discussed for years already, but are not nearing im-
plementation
Second, the Copenhagen Accord calls for a balanced allo-
cation between adaptation and mitigation. But so far only 
22% of total climate finance has been disbursed to adap-
tation. This figure would be even lower if it was not for 
the early operationalisation of the LCDF (around 2002), 
the SPA (2004), the SCCF (around 2002). At least 25% of 
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support LDCs in preparing and implementing National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). Other ma-
jor contributions to adaptation come from the Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF; USD 80 million) and came 
from the Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA; USD 49 
million)(data from www.climatefundsupdate.org). The 
SCCF aims to implement long-term adaptation meas-
ures that increase the resilience of national development 
sectors to the impacts of climate change. The already 
completed SPA pilot programme of the GEF aimed to 
address local adaptation needs and to generate global 
environmental benefits in some of the GEF’s focal areas: 
biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land 
degradation, and persistent organic pollutants. Finally, 
the Adaptation Fund is a financial instrument under the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol that finances adaptation 
projects and programs in developing countries through 
grants. Unique in this fund is that it is largely financed 
through a 2% levy on the Certified Emission Reduction 
units issued under the Clean Development Mechanism of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Up to date the voluntary pledges by 
donor countries only make up 35% of the size of the fund. 
It only became operational in 2009 and so far disbursed 
USD 22 million. 
The large number of funds makes guidance unclear, 
transaction costs high and accessibility low. On the posi-
tive side, the variety of funds could ease the mobilization 
of funds as each and every donor will be able find a fund 
that suits its aims or perception of climate finance. How-
ever, the reality is that the disbursements of the funds are 
still inadequate to meet adaptation needs in developing 
countries.Therefore, in the Copenhagen and Cancun cli-
mate summits the Annex I countries pledged to mobilize 
USD 100 billion per annum for developing countries from 
2020 onwards. The ‘Green Climate Fund’ will be estab-
lished as an operating entity of the financial mechanism 
to channel most of this money to support mitigation, ad-
aptation, capacity-building, technology development and 
transfer in developing countries, and REDD+ (Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) 
. For the period 2010-2012, USD 30 billion new and ad-
ditional Fast Start Finance (FSF) was committed. This 
money is being mobilized voluntarily and not based on 
a distribution key. How climate finance will be increased 
by tenfold in the coming eight years, or what will happen 
in between the two finance commitment periods (2013-
2019), remains unclear. The current economic and finan-
cial crises complicate these issues even more.
Fast Start Finance
Up to date almost USD 32 billion of climate finance has 
been pledged. Even though this does include some fund-
ing from before the Fast Start Finance period commenced 
in 2010, it is 7% more than was committed in Copenha-
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the adaptation finance was already received before the 
Copenhagen Accord. Furthermore, and only 14% of the 
approved funding is allocated to adaptation (see Figure 
3). According to the UNFCCC this percentage is on the 
increase, but it is still very little compared to the tens of 
billions US Dollar that are needed for adaptation in devel-
oping countries annually. From the perspective of climate 
finance as damage repayment for a problem caused by 
industrialized countries, it is even unacceptable. The next 
section will explain the challenges for financing adapta-
tion.
Underlying complexity of financing adaptation
There are several reasons why financing adaptation is a 
difficult process. First, as is already elaborated on in the 
section ´Adaptation and Development´, there is the lack 
of a broadly accepted definition of adaptation and its re-
lation to development. Second, this makes it hard to label 
an activity as adaptation and to express its successfulness 
in terms of costs and benefits as such. Unlike mitigation, 
where cost per ton of abated CO2 emissions is a useful 
proxy to measure the effectiveness of a measure, suc-
cessful adaptation is usually hard to measure, report and 
verify. And it depends on climate change: climate events 
are needed to show that a dike construction was cost-
effective or that measures to reduce agricultural losses 
under dry conditions reduce the impact on food security 
and economic development. 
Third, many mitigation measures can be profitable, but 
making adaptation profitable is difficult. Investment 
costs in mitigation (e.g. energy efficiency) might be high, 
but the incremental costs can be negative when such a 
measure reduces the energy consumption. The biggest 
uncertainty here is how energy prices will change, but 
the measure’s effectiveness is independent of how the cli-
mate changes. An additional benefit is that the potential 
of making profit can leverage private investments in miti-
gation. This is much more complex for adaptation: calcu-
lations of the costs and benefits of adaptation are based 
on uncertain projections of inter alia climate change, eco-
nomic growth, and population growth. The calculations 
often fail to value a human life and ecosystems; and often 
involve a longer term perspective. Longer term perspec-
tives are usually less attractive for private investments, 
especially when it concerns developing countries with 
risky business environments. 
Finally, even if profitable adaptive measures can be iden-
tified, many vulnerable countries and especially the poor-
est and most marginal sectors of society therein lack ac-
cess to private finance due to poor credit ratings, the risk 
of changing policies, currency risks, technology risks, and 
limited institutional financial capacity. All these factors 
contribute to a lack of absorptive capacity, which con-
strains high up-front investments in developing coun-
tries. It is thus unclear in which sectors and which coun-
tries the private sector could finance adaptation. Private 
sector pilot projects with specific adaptation aims need to 
be carried out and analyzed by independent researchers 
to get a better understanding of the potential of private 
sector finance in adaptation.
The earlier discussed institutionalisation of climate 
change adaptation at the local and national level would 
increase the absorptive capacity of developing countries, 
might open up profitable adaptation projects, and will 
give developing countries a stronger voice in internation-
al climate change negotiations. In this sense it is a good 
step that for example the African Development Bank is 
setting up the Green Africa Fund to receive, manage and 
deliver funds, specified towards Africa´s specific circum-
stances. Harmonization with other funds and easy ac-
cessibility are key for this fund to have an added value. 
Other countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Guyana 
and Senegal are also setting up recipient funds to con-
nect climate finance to broader and climate compatible 
development plans, both in terms of mitigation and ad-
aptation. 
Figure 4. Pledged, deposited, approved and disbursed 
climate finance
Of the pledged and deposited funding it is unclear how much is 
allocated to adaptation. Source: www.climatefundsupdate.org, 
data from October 2011.
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Recommendations
To sum up, almost 32 billion climate finance has 
been pledged so far, but only 42% has been depos-
ited, and only six per cent received. Adaptation fi-
nance from the private sector is scarce. It is unlikely 
that the public and private sector alone will mobilize 
the pledged annual USD 100 billion climate finance; 
and it is unlikely that they will disburse it in a trans-
parent, country and sector inclusive, and predictable 
manner. Finance needs to be increased through in-
novative mechanisms including aviation and mari-
time transport levies.
Climate finance allocation to adaptation falls short. 
On a global scale mitigation is more important than 
adaptation, but on the local scale it is often the other 
way around. Based on the polluter pays principle, cli-
As mentioned earlier the COP 16 in Cancun made major 
advancement regarding the institutionalisation of adap-
tation.  It established the Cancun Adaptation Framework 
(CAF) as an overall framework to further advance action 
on adaptation, including institutional arrangements and 
processes. The CAF clearly emphasizes the need for fur-
ther action on adaptation by spelling out a number of ac-
tivities that parties should undertake in this regard. These 
include among others the planning and implementation 
of adaptation projects and programmes, assessments of 
vulnerability, adaptation and impacts of climate change, 
advancing climate related research and information, ad-
vancing capacity building and institutional building for 
adaptation and increasing the resilience of socio-econom-
ic and ecologic systems. 
Regarding the institutional arrangements and processes 
an Adaptation Committee (AC) was established under 
the CAF to oversee and advance the action on adapta-
tion. In addition, the CAF contains provisions to establish 
a process for LDC countries to develop and implement 
National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) geared towards their 
medium and long-term adaptation needs. As adaptation 
has to be tackled on various temporal scales, these NAPs 
serve as a helpful addition to the officially short-term ori-
ented NAPAs. 
While most modalities of these institutional arrangements 
still need to be fleshed out, they constitute important cor-
nerstones for the more effective institutionalisation of 
adaptation and financing thereof. As shown in Figure 1, 
adaptation is currently addressed in different work pro-
grammes and under different bodies of the Convention. 
In addition, an increasing number of actors work on the 
topic outside the Convention. There is thus a high risk of 
duplication of efforts, fragmentation and the inefficient 
use of (financial) resources. One of the stated objectives 
of the AC is to promote “adaptation in a coherent manner 
under the Convention” If it succeeds in establishing close 
links between the other related institutions both under 
as well as outside the Convention, this could contribute 
considerably to reducing the above mentioned risks. If 
it fails, however, it would add to rather than reduce the 
overall level of fragmentation of adaptation, establishing 
yet another body on adaptation under the Convention. 
There are currently various options discussed on how 
to improve linkages between the AC, relevant institu-
tions under and outside the convention and the financial 
mechanisms on adaptation under the convention. These 
include fostering information exchange between the vari-
ous institutions, holding joint meetings and consultations 
and providing guidance and advice to the respective bod-
IV. Opportunities for more effective institutionalization and financing 
of adaptation
mate finance for adaptation needs prioritization in 
some cases. Therefore, the percentage of climate fi-
nance that goes to adaptation needs to be increased 
to at least 50%
Action needs to be taken to increase the accessibility 
to adaptation finance. Donors also have an impor-
tant role here, for example by being more transpar-
ent on accessibility and expenditure, and by chan-
neling significant financial resources through the 
Green Climate Fund. Recipients need to build capaci-
ty to adapt and to absorb climate finance. The estab-
lishment of recipient funds seems to be a step in the 
right direction. Where absorptive capacity remains 
low, the UNFCCC (specifically the Adaptation Com-
mittee –see next section) and donors should help 
build capacity to improve it.
ies. Improving the information flow is certainly a useful 
starting point, but the role of the AC should go further 
and include coordination of adaptation activities under 
the convention. This should be achieved by monitoring 
and assessing activities as a basis to provide recommen-
dations for action under the COP and by giving advice 
on eligibility criteria and allocation mechanisms for adap-
tation finance. Developing evaluation methodologies for 
adaptation activities and improving access to knowledge 
are further potential instruments of the AC to ensure coor-
dination and consistency between the various institutions.
In Cancún it was also decided to establish the Standing 
Committee (SC). The SC will assist the COP in exercis-
ing its climate finance functions, ranging from improving 
coherence and coordination to mobilization of financial 
resources and the measurement, reporting and verifica-
tion of support provided to developing country Parties. 
These are all very important issues but how the Standing 
Committee will fulfill such a role is still an open question. 
So far this committee has however received little attention 
from donors, researchers and Parties. A decision on the 
role of the Standing Committee will probably be made 
during the COP17 in Durban. Whatever will be decided, 
it is important to clarify the relation between the SC and 
the AC to avoid duplication and fragmentation in adapta-
tion finance. 
Ultimately, the responsibility for the development and 
implementation of adaptation programmes and strate-
gies rests with the respective countries. This is also re-
flected in the COP decisions on the AC, where explicit 
reference is made to a country-driven approach when im-
plementing adaptation. The AC should thus focus on pro-
viding technical support and guidance during this pro-
cess as it has no additional role in financing adaptation 
apart from this guidance function. Such technical sup-
port is urgently needed as many institutions particularly 
in developing countries are not yet adequately prepared 
for defining long-term adaptation needs and implement-
ing adaptation on the ground, given the complexity and 
uncertainty of climate change impacts and the multitude 
of underlying drivers that contribute to vulnerability to 
climate change as well as pressing development needs. 
As adaptation is a cross-sectoral issue, close cooperation 
is needed between various institutions nationally but 
also between the national and the international level. In 
this regard, the CAF also calls for the establishment of 
regional centres to advance adaptation at this level and in 
order to function as a transmitter of information between 
international and national institutions. It will be one of 
the tasks of the AC to identify synergies and strengthen 
cooperation on various levels.
Taking into account the close link between adaptation 
and development, the AC could support the integration 
of adaptation into national and sectoral development 
strategies and programs at the country level by provid-
ing information and sharing best practices through its 
network function. Care needs to be taken that this does 
not result in a duplication of efforts with already exist-
ing capacity building activities. There is still a need for 
mainstreaming adaptation to climate change both within 
those sectors that will be affected by the impacts of cli-
mate change, and integration into cross-sectoral develop-
ment strategies such as, for example, Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP). This ensures that in the long run 
development objectives are not jeopardized by climate 
change.
The Green Climate Fund with its envisaged large volume 
and its broad approach has adaptation as one focus on its 
rather broad agenda. It remains to be seen to what extent 
the fund will distribute the annual USD 100 billion cli-
mate finance from developed countries starting in 2020, 
as donor countries might prefer to spend their funding 
mainly through bilateral channels, which guarantees 
them higher visibility and more direct influence on the 
use of the money. The involvement of the private sector, 
and private sector finance in particular, is also still under 
discussion. Another open issue is how to balance the al-
location between mitigation and adaptation. As stated in 
the climate finance section, financing mitigation is often 
more attractive than financing adaptation from a donor 
perspective. Thus, the future of the fund and its useful-
ness for adaptation will depend on the foci to be set by the 
Transitional Committee that is working on its establish-
ment; and the board later on.
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Recommendations
The increasingly complex institutional arrangements 
for adaptation and the diversification of Parties, 
Groups, Committees, Non-State Actors etc  harbors 
the risk of increasing fragmentation. The UNFCCC’s 
Adaptation Committee holds potentials for reducing 
the fragmentation of institutions dealing with adap-
tation. We recommend a strong role for developing 
countries in the Adaptation Committee as success-
ful and cost-effective adaptation is more difficult in 
developing countries than in developed countries. 
Furthermore, the Adaptation Committee should not 
reinvent the wheel, but rather make good use of ex-
isting knowledge and networks. Information sharing 
is of utmost importance to prevent duplication of 
work and fragmentation but instead stimulate inte-
gration and consolidation
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Although improvements can be made, it is fair to state 
that adaptation has been institutionalized international-
ly. The national and local levels need to be equipped bet-
ter to take on the climate change adaptation challenge. 
Financing of adaptation has also been institutionalized 
and financial resources for adaptation have increased 
in recent years. However, they still fall short and it is 
unclear how USD 100 billion of climate finance will be 
mobilized annually from 2020 onwards. We finish this 
policy paper with some conclusive recommendations 
for both institutionalizing and financing of adaptation.
● Development cooperation and climate finance share 
the goal of climate compatible social, environmental 
and economic development, but the current finance 
debate divides them. We recommend the improve-
ment of a straightforward definition of climate fi-
nance and its relation to ODA. For example, do loans 
count? Does it count if an international company is 
climate proofing its local business? These definitions 
must be broadly accepted by donors and recipients 
alike. The OECD DAC markers can serve as a start-
ing point, but its procedure of self-reporting by do-
nors needs to be addressed to increase transparency. 
Funding for development and adaptation should 
be separated at the source, but not whilst spending. 
Broadly agreed definitions should be in place before 
2020 when much larger sums of climate finance from 
public and private sources and innovative mecha-
nisms are supposed to come into play. 
● Almost 32 billion climate finance has been pledged 
so far. But currently only 42% has been deposited, 
only 6.1% received, and only 1.4% is spent on adap-
tation. This raises two important points. First, that 
the public and private sector are unlikely to mobi-
lize USD 100 annually as pledged. Finance has to be 
increased through innovative mechanisms including 
levies on aviation and maritime transport. Second, 
mitigation is prioritized and this is indeed the most 
important challenge from a global perspective. But 
on the local scale adaptation is often more important. 
Based on the polluter pays principle, climate finance 
for adaptation often needs to be prioritized. There-
fore, the percentage of climate finance going to ad-
aptation needs to be increased to at least 50%.
● Improve accessibility of adaptation finance. The 
abundance of climate funds has not lead to large 
scale finance for adaptation, but does contribute to 
low transparency and accessibility, and high trans-
action costs. Funds outside the UNFCCC also seem 
to detract from the importance of funding under 
the convention. Donor countries should pursue the 
Green Climate Fund to channel significant amounts 
of climate finance and they should endorse develop-
ing country ownership in designing, financing and 
implementing adaptation activities. Recipient coun-
tries need to build capacity to adapt and to absorb 
climate finance at national and local level. Specific 
situations in different environments (political, social, 
economic, and environmental) require tailor-made 
and bottom-up adaptation practices. The NAPs offer 
opportunities for this. The establishment of nation-
al funding entities to manage climate finance and 
mainstream adaptation into national development 
plans seems to be a step in the right direction. Where 
absorptive capacity remains low, the UNFCCC (es-
pecially the Adaptation Committee) and donors 
should help to build capacity to improve it.
● The increasingly complex institutional arrangements 
for adaptation harbor the risk of increasing fragmen-
tation. The Adaptation Committee holds potentials 
to limit fragmentation. We recommend a strong role 
for developing countries in the Adaptation Commit-
tee as their challenge to adapt is larger. Furthermore, 
the Adaptation Committee should not reinvent the 
wheel, but rather make good use of existing knowl-
edge and networks. Information sharing is of utmost 
importance to prevent duplication of work and frag-
mentation but instead stimulate integration and con-
solidation.
Finally, a post-Kyoto agreement is crucial. While it is not 
the aim of this paper to write about mitigation, it should 
not be forgotten that failure to mitigate climate change 
will increase the burden of adaptation.
V. Conclusion and outlook
This policy brief has been written in the framework of the BMZ-funded flagship 
project on “Climate Change and Development” by the German Development In-
stitute (DIE) in Bonn. Data on climate finance in section 3 is largely based on the 
website www.climatefundsupdate.org which has been developed by the Overseas 
Development Institute and the Heinrich Böll Stiftung.
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